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OF THE KIND OF CASE
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ants under a Bill of Sale dated April 2, 1932 and an
Agreement dated April 6, 1932 relating to the sale then
by plaintiffs to defendants of their undivided interests
in the assets of Salt Lake ·Transfer Company.

DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT
At the request of the plaintiffs, the trial of the
case was divided into two phases, the first as to the interpretation of the contractual relationships between the
parties under the 1932 Agreement and determination of
what measure of liability shall be applied. A separate
trial was had thereafter to determine the amount of the
purchase price payable to plaintiffs by defendants in
which the trial court made, entered and filed its Findings,
Conclusions and Judgment on those issues. Therein the
court construed the 1932 Bill of Sale and Agreement as
requiring a June 3, 1960 valuation of the assets, sold by
plaintiffs in 1932, 'vhereas defendants claim that the
basis of valuation should be as of April of 1932. The
court found that plaintiffs were not partners and that
their 1932 Agree1nent was not void for fraud, mistake
or undue influence. By a separate trial, the court then
1nade Findings and entered Judgment against defendants
for $181,841.07 as being the 1960 value of the undivided
interests sold in 1932, together with unpaid interest.
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RELII1JF SOl'OH'£ OX APPEAL
l>•·fpndants

~l'Pk

l'PYPrsal of the trial court's Find-

in~~

and .Judguwnts insofar as they adjudge that det't•tHlant~ shall pay for the purchase of plaintiffs' share
of t lw company a~~Pt~ as of their value on June 3, 1960
nnd ask that those Findings and J udg1nents be reversed
nnd that the trial court be directed to determine the value
of Uw assets as of April 6, 19·32, the date of plaintiffs'
Agreement Relating to Salt L~ake Transfer Company.
Defendants also attack the valuations as determined by
the court and ask for reduction of those sums.
S'J.1ATEMENT OF FAOTS
Prior to April 2, 1932 the Salt Lake Transfer Company was a partnership operating in Utah with its office
in Salt Lake City, consisting of George H. Sims (father)
and two of his sons, George A. Sims and Milton K. Sims.
The respective interests of the partners at that time were
as follows:
Partner

George H. Sims
George A. Sims
~Iilton

K. Sims

Shares in Assets

3j5
1j5
1/5

Share in Profits

1/3
1/3
1/3
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On April 2, 1932, just prior to his demise, the father
executed his Bill of Sale (Exhibit P-A) transferring his
"right, title and interest" in the company to his nine children, each to have a 1j9th interest thereof (plaintiff
Gladys S. Bullough actually received 2j9ths, one for herself and one for her brother, John.) Thus each child
received from his and her father a 6.666% interest (lj9th
of 3j5ths) in the assets and 1/27th ( 3. 711 o/o) interest in
the profits. This, then vested in George A. Sims and
Milton K. Sims, the two surviving partners, each
10j27ths of the profits and 12/45th of the assets and
they, on April 5, 1932, formed a new Salt Lake 'Transfer
Company partnership ·with the two of them as sole partners. (Exhibit D-'T)
On April 6, 1932, the surviving children (grantees
in the Bill of Sale) executed the Agreement Relating to
Salt Lake Transfer C01npany (Exhibit P-B) whereby
each of the plaintiffs, who never had been partners "hereby sells and conveys" all of his or her interest, which they
had just received from their father, to the two brothers
as surviving partners, George A. and :Milton K., who
agreed (paragraph 3) "upon six months demand from
the person so selling, to pay for each one-ninth to purchased one-ninth of the sum found as the value of the
GEORGE H. SIMS interest as per Bill of Sale above
mentioned." Then it was agreed that (paragraph 4)
"until such purchase su1n is demanded or is paid, it will
pay one-twenty-seventh of the net n1onthly profits, if any,
for each ninth so purchased."
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'rhP two brot h•·rs carried on thPir business as Salt

Lake Tran~fer Company continuously frmn that date
in .\ pri 1. I !l:~~ until death of l\lilton 1\:. Sims in 19'59. The
t·o111pnny still <'ontinues under tPrms of a 1946 partner~hip agn·Pment bPhrPPn those two and tlwir sons, Grant
0. Sim~ and Elmer L. Sims. (Exhibit D-L) Following
~I ilton K. ·~ dNLth, discussions were had as to payment
now to plaintiffs of the su1ns owing on the 1932 agreed
~ale prie•• . The parties first agreed as to the amount
to h•• paid and plaintiffs rejected a later tender of the
pur<'ha~P price and accrued interest made to each of
thl'm and filed this action June 3, 19,60. ·The trial court
•·on::;t nwd such a filing as being the demand for payment
n\fl•tTed to in paragraph 3 of the Agreement. (R. 111)
The faets shown by the record, which appear to defendants to sustain their contention that there was n
sale made in 1932 based upon the 1932 values, the sale
pricl\ hmn•yer not to be paid to plaintiffs as sellers until

after ::;ix months de1nand, are as follows:
1. the Bill of Sale from the father (Exhibit P-A)

dated

~-\pril

\\i:'ht>~

:2, 1932 prescribes "In any case any Grantee

to withdraw his or her interest in the partnership

prnperty. the value of the same shall be appraised by
Glady~ ~. Bullough and George A. Si1ns and the figure
~d

by thesf• two shall be binding upon the withdrawing

t~rantee";
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2. said two, Gladys (a plaintiff) and George A. (a
defendant) did in fact execute in 1947 a valuation of the
assets as of April1932 (Exhibits D - H and I), this was
based upon the values as known to them and after a
careful review of the books of the company by Mrs. Bullough's husband. (R. 230, 243);
3. the Bill of Sale (Exhibit P-A) and the Agreement (Exhibit P-B) were executed in 19'32, the depth of
the Depression, when money was not readily available
to pay for the interests of the brothers and sisters;
4. the said Agreement (Exhibit P-B) was a withdrawal by plaintiffs from the partnership and states that
in 1932 the plaintiffs had a present intention to sell
then and defendants an intention to buy then and there,
but there was a deferred time of payment as shown lJy
the following tenns of said documents signed by plaintiffs:
(a) first it recognized the former partnership relationship of the father and two sons;
(b) it acknowledged the Bill of Sale from the father
dated April 2, 1932;
(c) recites in preamble, "Whereas, these children
of George H. Sims who have not been in the partnership
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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1 l"~ire to

~wll th('i r inh•rP~t in the partnership to the two

rNnaining partners and the latter are willing to purchase
t lw :-;:unt·";
(d) tlH•y "approve such Bill of Sale and of the
tllt>thod thPrein ~wt forth for valuing the share owned

hy < h•orgt> II. Sims at the time of the execution of such
Bill of

~all•'';

(e) the present Salt Lake Transfer Company is de~ignatPd a~ "n•ml<>Ps" and plaintiffs as "vendors";

(f) vendees are said to "hereby purchase and each

of the vendors hereby sells and conveys";
(g) vendees assume all obligations of the former
~alt

Lake Transfer Company;
(h) .. 3. The present Salt Lake Transfer Company

a~n·Ps,

upon six months demand from the person so

~t·llin~.

to pay for each one-ninth so purchased, oneninth of the sum found as the value of the GEORGE H.
~I ~I~ interest as per the Bill of Sale above mentioned.";
(i) "until such purchase sum is den1anded or is
paid" vendees shall pay vendors one-twenty-seventh of
tlw net monthly profits";
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(j) upon demand for the purchase price, "sellers

right to share in the profits shall cease and he or she
shall be entitled to interest on the sale price at six per
cent per annum until paid";
(k) "purchaser shall be entitled at any time to pay
any seller the purchase price for his share plus accrued
net profits or interest, to date of payment";
(l) "each of the vendors" covenanted that no prior
sale had been made by him or her.
Since that time, in lieu of a stated percent of interest
on the unpaid purchase price, plaintiffs have each received as interest on such sale a sum equal to 1/27th of
the net profits of the business, with a small sum being
withheld occasionally with the knowledge and consent
of plaintiffs. None of the plaintiffs have participated
in the business since 1932 and the trial Court duly found
(Par. 12 of Findings) that they were not partners sine<·
the date of their Agremnent, April 6, 1932 (R. 111).
Defendants acknowledged liability for and are ready
to pay to the plaintiffs the value of the interest sold and
purchased in April 1932 plus any unpaid interest as
required by the Bill of Sale and the Agreement, but defendants disagree with the trial Court's interpretation
that said valuation is to be as of June 3, 19GO, the date
of filing this action. After the trial of the initial phase,
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tlt•l'Pndant~

paid to plaintiffs $48,000.00, representing
$".1100.00 earh. Plaintiffs have reePived and retained
the intt>n·~t~ paytnents (3.711% of the profits each) since
U):~:! without complaint or objection as to the validity
of tlwir 1932 Agreement (R. 180, 221). None have parti<'ipatPd in managenH'nt of Salt Lake Transfer, (R.
~.-)~, :20:2, :2:21 ) •
Tlw dPfendants contend that the Agreement should
lw con~trued to mean that the purchase price is the value
a~ of 1!):~:! but it need not be determined until and when
n dPmand for payment is made, and that at said time
the purcha~P price will be fixed based on the valuations
on tlw date of sale in 1932. In support of this the del't•JHlant~ contend that the continued payment to plaintiff~ of a ~hare of the net profits is interest and is not
indicia of a continued ownership interest in the assets
of ~alt Lake Transfer C01npany. 'Yithin the meaning of
their father'~ Bill of Sale, the Agreen1ent was a "withdrawal" on April 6, 1932 by plaintiffs.
:-;hortly after the death of ~I. K. Si1ns in 1959,
~Pveral of the plaintiffs met with George A. Sims and
a di:'<'ll~:'ion developed relative to cOinpletion of the sale
and purchase of the family interests. At that time George
offL·red to transfer to each one, stock having a value
nf $1~.000.00. Each agreed that such was a fair price

and pffort~ were 1nade to procure the stock that very
day. hut the safe deposit box section of the bank was
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closed (R. 184 and 208). The next day, George withdrew
his offer after a discusion with his partners. This is
the nearest bona fide valuation on an eye to eye basi~
between the actual parties hereto.
It will be recalled that there were nine children at
the time of their father's 1932 Bill of Sale. One of said
nine, John Sims, had the same interest as each of the
six plaintiffs. He is a businessman engaged in operating
an automobile sales business in California. After the
death of the brother, M. K. Sims and shortly prior to
the filing of this case in 1960, he 1net with George A.
Si1ns and agreed upon a valuation of $10,000.00 (R. 757
and 769), which sum was then paid to him for his 1/27th
interest. The six remaining family members, plaintiffs
herein, have each obtained judgment for the same 1j27th
interest for $27,358.88 plus $5,152.63 retained earnings,
which was valued in its entirety by John at $10,000.00
in 1960 and by several of the plaintiffs themselves at
$18,000.00 in 1959 (R. 187) and by Mrs. Bullough, another plaintiff, in 19-!7 at $3,61-1-.41 exclusive of retained
earnings (Exhibits D-H).
In the second phase of the trial, the court took evidence on the valuations of the assets as of June 3, 1960.
Testimony as to values varied considerably and the
details will be discussed in the Argument relating to
Points VI, VII and VIII. ·The final gross valuation of
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thl' a~~t't~ (Salt Lake Transfer plus Sims Realty) at
$-llO.::~:L:~;> i~ a salvage value, but no allowance was given
for the ('o~t~ of liquidation or salvage.
The plaintiffs' Contentions raised at pre-trial for the
fi r~t time the issues of "fraud, mistake, undue influence"
(H. 85). The court required proof by clear and convincing evidence on this issue ( R. 89). Not only was no
proof given, but all of the plaintiffs testified that the
only defendant present in 1932 when their Agreement
was signed was their brother George A. Sims, and each
one of them volubly expressed their great love and esteem for him (R. 136, 166-67, 194, 205, 21-1, 223). Finding
Xo. 11 properly detennined that the 19'32 Agreement "is
not Yoid or unenforceable on the grounds of fraud, mistake or undue influence" (R. 111).
The remaining issue of fact was the contention of
plaintiffs that they were partners in Salt Lake Transfer
l~ompany and hence entitled to an ownership share in
tlw a~8ets and to a winding up of the affairs because of
tlw death of ~L 1{. Sims in 1959. The issues and facts
on this phase will be discussed more in particular in
reply to the plaintiff's Cross Appeal, sufficient at this
time to note that the record reveals, first that plaintiffs
~old out tlwir interests in 1932 to a partnership con~i::'ting of only two individuals, George A. Sims and 11.
K. Sims (Exhibit P-B); next, the state regulatory bodies,
l.C.C'. and Public Service Connnission of rtah never
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recognized any plaintiff as a partner, (Exhibits D-0,
D-P, D-Q, D-R, D-S); none of the plaintiffs testified
that any of them had participated in manage1nent at any
time (19·32 to now) (R. 158, 202, 2.21); and the only
semblance of partnership evidence was that the income
tax returns after 1941 reflected plaintiff's names as partners, though the testimony and returns are clear that
prior to that time only the two true partners were shown,
George A. and M. K. Sims, but in 1941 the Internal
Revenue Service required the change for tax purposes.
The court found (R. 111) "12. Plaintiffs and defendants
were not partners at any time since April G, 1932."
ARGUMENT
POINT I
A VALID SALE AND PURCHASE OF PLAINTIFFS'
FRACTIONAL

INTERE<BTS

WAS

ACCOMPLISHED

IN

APRIL 1932 WITH THE THEN AGREED PURCHASE PRICE
TO BE PAID AT A LATER DATE.

The historical background of this matter helps us
to view the issues as the parties must have viewed them
when the two docun1ents were signed in 1932 relating
to the assets of Salt Lake ·Transfer Company. ·The father
had been ill and he executed a Bill of Sale transferring
his 3/5th interest in Salt Lake Transfer Company to his
nine children just prior to his de1nise (Exhibit P-A.)
During the four day interim betwePn his dPmise and
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tht• t'nnPral, thP two surviving partners, Oeorge A. Si1ns
und ~litton K. Sim~ fornwd the "present" Salt Lake
'rransfer ( ompany partnership and following the fat ltl'r·~ funeral, the plaintiffs, together with their two
brother~. the surviving partners, executed the Agreement
Bl'lating to ~alt Lake Transfer Company, (Exhibit P-B ).
The hu~itw~~ would have floundered had not the two
~nrviving partners made an effective arrangement to
hny out the fractional interests of their brothers and
~i~tt·r~ acquired under the father's Bill of Sale. Howt'\'Pr, the two partners did not have the money with which
to pay tlw purchase price then because of the severe
Depression conditions, and hence agreed that they would
pay such purchase price at a future date when demanded
hy the sellers or earlier, at the election of the buyers.
In the meantime, in lieu of interest which might have
heen vt>ry oppressive had a fixed rate been set during
this Depression period, the partners agreed to pay to
their brothers and sisters each 1/27 of the net profits
of the business until the purchase price was demanded.
1

There can be no doubt as to the intent of a present
Rale and purchase of those interests acquired from the
father, as the Agree1nent (Exhibit P-B) uses the present
ten::-;l' in the references thereto : the first being that the
plaintiffs "desire to sell their interest"· the next the

'

'

defendants as the remaining partners "are willing to
purchase the same." Then, the undersigned being all
of the children, "approve such Bill of Sale and the methSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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od therein set forth for valuing the share owned by
George H. Sims." 'This valuing is recited to be "at the
time of the execution of such Bill of Sale." Obviously,
four days after the execution of the Bill of Sal<·, there
was no reason for including such language relating back
to the Bill of Sale time unless it was the intention of all
parties that the property should be valued as of said
date, namely, April 2, 1932. That language referred to
above was in the preamble of the Agreement and constituted the "withdrawal" referred to in tlw father's
Bill of Sale.
Paragraph 1 of Exhibit P-B states that "each intends to be legally bound hereby." Such, of course, is
in the present tense. Paragraph 2 recites that the "vendees hereby purchase and each of the vendors hereby
sells and conveys." Such is certainly an unequivocal an<l
unambiguous declaration of sale and purchase rather
than agreement to sell and purchase in the future. Said
paragraph 2 also includes the language "said purchast·rs
hereby assume all obligations of the fonner partnership
and agree to pay the smne." Once again, this 'ras a
present assumption of the past obligations of the deceased father and other partners ·which then and thrn•,
relieved the plaintiffs of any obligation tlwreon.
The third paragraph recites that the "present Salt
Lake Transfer Company agrees, upon six months demand
of the person so selling, to pay for each 1/9 so purSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ehast>d 1/9 of the su1n found as the value as per the Bill
of Sale above 1nentioned." Here is the first future
temw exprPHsion in the Agreeinent and it refers solely
to the time of payment, and ties down the amount to
hP paid at such future date to the value of the father's
interPHt "as per the Bill of Sale." A Creditor-Debtor
relationship was ereated then and there, not a promise
to buy or an option to buy.

In the next paragraph, defendants agree that "until
such purchase sum is demanded or is paid" that 1/27
of the net monthly profits will be paid and that after
~urh demand the interest on the sale price shall be 6%
per annum until paid rather than a continuation of the
interest predicated upon 1/27 of the net nwnthly profits,
if any. In paragraph 6 the plaintiffs as "vendors" in
the present tense, warrant that no prior sale or transfer
of their interest ''in the old partnership" has been made.
The relationship continued on through the Depres~ion days and thereafter until following the death of
~l. K. ~ims in 1959. Neither the sellers demanded their
money, nor did the buyers offer to pay the agreed
purchase price, though either party and any one of the
sellers had the option to do so earlier. In the meantime,
the intere8t obligation was paid to the family members
a~ sellers annually, with a few exceptions, until the

filing of this litigation. Defendants acknowledge that
they must pay the balance owing on the unpaid accrued
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interest to date of said law suit and also must pay 6%
interest on the purchase price from date of filing the
law suit until judgment.
That a valid sale and purchase was intended and
accomplished then in 1932, may be seen clearly from the
Agreement itself by use of the words in it normally
associated with a present sale and purchase:
(Exhibit P-B)
Preamble"desire to sell their interest" "willing to purchase"
Paragraph 2 "vendee hereby purchases""each of the vendors hereby sells
and conveys"
Paragraph 3 "the person so selling" Paragraph 4 "the purchase sum"
"interest on the sale price."
Paragraph 5 "the purchaser" -

"any seller"

Paragraph 6 'vendors" Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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\V e can think of no words of art or of common usage
whieh could be used which would more clearly and without ambiguity express the intent and fact of a present
sale and a present purchase between the plaintiffs as
":-;ellPr~" and "vendors" to their two brothers, the surviving partners who had formed the "present Salt Lake
TransfPI' Company" as "purchaser" and "vendee."
The fact of an accomplished present sale and present
purchase was in no manner diminished by the future
ptt)1nent provisions. The former partnership with their
fath(•r had ended by his death on April 2nd. On April
5th, the two surviving partners George and M. K. (Exhibit D-T) formed the "present Salt Lake Transfer
Company" and filed with the Salt Lake County Clerk
their Affidavit of Assumed Narne, the next month. Part
of the brothers and sisters were here from out of the
state for the father's funeral and each had a lj15th
interest which had been acquired four days before from
their father. The two partners then and there bought
tho~P seven fractional interests which were outstanding.
The two partners agreed to pay for such when
demanded and provided for interest until such purchase
price was de1nanded at lj27th of the net profits and at
6% per annum after demand and until paid. Nothing
inconsistent with a present sale and purchase is to be
inferred from the delay in payment of the purchase
price. The relationship of the 1932 Depression years to
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the deferment of the payment of the then agreed purchase price is understandable as well as the payment
of interest on a percentage of profits basis rather than
a fixed rate per annum.

POINT II
THE BILL OF SALE AND THE AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN 1932 ARE CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS AND
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMI'T'TING PAROLE EVIDENCE
OF PLAINTIFF'S TO VARY OR "INTERPRET" SAME.

POINT III
THE AGREED PURCHASE PRICE WAS THE VALUE
IN APRIL 1932 AND THE COURT ERRED IN CONSTRUING
THE BILL OF SALE AND THE AGREEMENT AS REQUIRING PAYMENT BY DEFENDENT'S OF A PURCHASE PRIOE
BASED ON A 1960 VALUATION.

'The passage of time from 1932 to 1960, ·wherein an
Agreement between the parties has not been challenged
and no differences have arisen, seems to give some
sanctity to the Agreement and indicate that it was not
mnbiguous. The very language itself is stated in clear,
common terms which are easily understandable. The
history of its execution and the Depression period make
the contract logical.
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For tlw plaintiffs to succeed in their attack upon
thPir brother, George, for wh01n they profess so much
lovP in their testimony, they must twist their Agreement
from a prt:>sPnt sale and purchase transaction to a deal
to buy and sell an interest at some later date. This has
been done by parole evidence over objections of defendants. At the very inception of this attempt by plaintiffs,
objections were raised. 'The first plaintiffs' witness was
~I r~. \Vinifred S. McDonald and objections were raised
as soon as the issues of parole evidence arose and the
('Otnt gave defendants a continuing objection (R. 138).
Then at R. 1-t-1 we find:
" ... MR. PUGSLEY: We object to this testion the grounds that apparently it's trying
to lay a premise for altering. May we have a continuing objection to this line f'

mon~·

THE COURT: "You may have a continuing
objection as to parole evidence."
~imilar objections were made and granted as to
other plaintiffs when they testified, but the court proCPeded to hear the evidence.

The creditor-debtor relationship was established in
1932. At that tune and for some years afterwards
David Bullough, husband of plaintiff, Gladys S. Bullough, was the bookkeeper at Salt Lake Transfer Company. Ht:> was an accountant in his own right and sent
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out statements annually to the plaintiffs (family members) showing the amount of interest paid to each one
during the preceding year by way of 1/27th of the
net profits. Exhibit D-F is one such notice, it having
been produced from the files of Mrs. George S. Malquist
(R .189). 'This exhibit refers to the year 1940 and was
sent out by 1\ir. Bullough February 22, 1941 to the plaintiffs who were designated by Mr. Bullough as "creditors
of Salt Lake Transfer Con1pany." Bullough's own letterhead, manifests the understanding of the parties at a
time much closer to 1932 than the plaintiffs oral selfserving declarations at a trial in 19·62.
Plaintiffs have received and retained the benefits
of their Agreement of April 6, 1932 throughout the yt>ars
and now have tortured their sales agree1nent into something entirely foreign from the expressed intention of
the parties at the time of execution thereof. There are
no ambiguities in the Agreement which would leave room
for extraneous oral interpretations by the parties, as
the present tense language of "vendors" and "a vendee"
selling and buying is clear and un1nistakable. Plaintiffs
would have this Court believe, and successfully convinced
the trial Court, that they had merely agreed to sell their
interests, which they received frmn their father, at some
future date wholly undetermined and at a price for
·which no formula or tin1e schedule was encompassed in
the agreement.
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rrhe father in his Bill of ~alP, prescribed that the
oldPst son and the oldest daughter, namely George H.
~imH and Gladys ~im~ Bullough should, on behalf of all
of the ehildren detennine the value of tlw interest which
hP <·onvt·~· .. d to them in April, 1932.
The Agreement expressly acknowledges the acquisition by tlH• plaintiffs of their interests under the Bill of
~alP, and all of the parties .. approve of such Bill of Sale
and of tlw method therein set forth for valuing the share
owned by George H. Sims at the time of the execution
of such Bill of Sale.'' What is the reason for them agreeing to the valuing of the share at the time of the execution of such Bill of Sale if this was merely an agreement
to sell at a future date at some value to be fixed as and
when this pretended option of purchase has been exerei~t>d, or the option to sell has been declared by the
plaintiffs? It would be unique in contract history for
parties to agree to sell at an undetermined future date
for an undetermined future price, the time and price
to be ascertaniable and determined by any of the eight
parties to the Agreement and hence different of each one.
\Y e have outlined above the details of the Agreement
it~Plf and its overwhelming language making clear the
intention of the parties to sell and the intention of
the partiPs to buy, and reciting in present terms the
~ah\

and the purchase of the interests which the plaintiffs

acquired frOin the father. There is nothing unusual in
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such an arrangement as the common business experience
in the purchase of an automobile or a residence, or in
the purchase of many other items of personal property
or business interests are made upon an installmc>nt purchase program, or upon a future payment program.
Particularly, there was nothing unusual during the Depression years for the parties to defer the time of payment of an agreed purchase price and to covenant to
pay interest to the seller until the said purchase price
has been paid in full. The ordinary real estate contract
is typical of such a transaction where the purchase price
is payable at the future date, either in a lump sum or an
installn1ent progrmn with interest payable during the
interim and with an option upon either the seller or the
buyer to accelerate or define the future payment date
by either the purchaser electing to pay on or before a
certain date or by the seller electing to require the
purchaser to refinance the sale through some financial
institution as prescribed by the contract.
The only substantial difference in this transaction
between the ordinary present sale and purchase of a
business or property is the covenant that the purchasers
shall receive a percentage of the "net monthly profits,
if any, for each ninth so purchased." Such an arrangement has been recognized in connnercial transactions for
many years, either the percentage of the profits of a
business sold or the percentage of the income on the
property sold in lieu of interest. \V e direct the attention
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of tlw eourt to the provisions of the Unifonn Partner:-;hip Ad, ~Pe. -t.S-1--t., which reads in part:

.. (-!) The receipt by a person of a share of
a business is prilna facie evidence that he is a
partner in the business, but no such inference
shall be drawn if such profits were received in
paymPnt:
* * * * *

(d) As interest on a loan, though the
amounts of payment vary with the profits
of the business."
The transaction between the parties resulted in a
present sale and present purchase of the undivided interest~ in the then assets of Salt Lake Transfer Company.
Possession thereof was delivered and held continuously
~inee April 1932 by the defendants. The plaintiffs have
not since that period of time exercised or attempted to
Pxercise any dominion over such assets so sold by them
and this is further evidence of their "withdrawal." The
relationship of debtor-creditor was established. The
isstw of whether the plaintiffs had a vendor's lien on
the property for the unpaid purchase price has not been
raised, but beyond that possibility, no contingency or
remaining interest in the assets was vested in the plaintiffs following the sale on April 6, 1932. They had a
right to be paid the unpaid purchase price, and they
had a right to be paid the agreed interest thereon, but
no higher or better interest, and absolutely no continuing
ownership share in the assets.
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The fact that there was no continuing interest in
the assets is clearly de1nonstrated by the court's finding
that the parties were not partners after April 6, 1932.
The fact is that the Certificate of Publie Convenience
and Necessity subsequently issued by the Interstate
Commerce Commission and by the Public Service Commission of Utah, as well as the titles to the real property,
at no time showed an interest in the plaintiffs.
It is submitted to the court that the language of
the Agreement is clear and unambiguous as to the fact
of a present sale on April 6, 1932 of the then assets
and the purchase thereof coupled with an obligation to
pay the said purchase price based upon the value of the
assets on the date of the father's Bill of Sale, four days
prior thereto, as and when the sellers' demandt>d their
money. There was only an obligation to pay the interPst
as prescribed by the Agreenwnt in the meantime.
\V e are highly a wan' of plaintiffs' attempts to make
something different of this Agree1nent by speculation
and inuendo and by hypotheses and by inferences. No
1natter how much they "suppose'' the language, there is
no legal basis for reversal of the clear and dir~ct language of the plaintiffs as "sellers" or "vendors" in the
Agreement that each "}H-'n•by sells and conveys.'' This
is not a mere option to sell in the future, nor a contract
to sell in the future. It was a transfer and conveyance
that very date, April 6, 193:2. The Court should not
write a new contract for the parties.
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That tlw defendants permitted the plaintiffs to continue on for an extended period of time, thereby benefiting hy t hP interest payment~ by way of 1/27th of the
net profits for twPnty-seven years, is not to be held
as prejudieial to defendants' rights. Had anyone or
mon· of the six plaintiffs elected to do so, they could
have called for their money in 1932 or any year thereafter. Rather, they liked this type interest on the unpaid
purcha~P price, and gladly received and retained such
inh•rt>st payments.
FPw eitations are needed to show the rule on contract interpretation that where the language is clear,
a~ it i~ here on the issue of a present sale and purchase
in l~);t~, such n1ay not be tortured into some other
meaning by construction or extraneous oral evidence.
Likl•wi~e when a document of sale has been duly exeeuted and delivered as in this case in 1932, one seeking
to alter or modify the same must present clear and convincing evidence, see Naisbitt v. Hodges, 307 P. 2d 620,
6 lTt. 2d 116; Pender v. Anderson, 235 P. 2d 360, 120
rt. 399.
It seems apparent from the relationship of the
parties on April 6, 1932 that this was a clear agreement
of the six plaintiffs to sell to their two elder brothers
who were the surviving partners, the interests received
from their father under his Bill of Sale. Having this
in mind plus the present tense language of buy and
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sell, vendor and vendee, buyers and sellers. We call
to the court's attention a few of the more recent expressions relating to contract interpretation.
Maw v. Noble, 354 P. 2d 121, 10 Ut. 2d 440:

"We are in agreement with the well-recognized rule urged by the defendants that where
there is uncertainty or ambiguity the contract
should be strictly construed against him who
draws it. But it is to be kept in mind that this
rule applies only where there is some genuine
lack of certainty, and not to strained or merely
fanciful or wishful interpretations that may be
indulged in. The primary and a more fundamental rule is that the contract must be looked at
realistically in the light of the circumstances
under which it 'vas entered into, and if the intent
of the parties can be ascertained with reasonabl<>
certainty it must be given effect."

Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice, 323 P. 2d 259, 7 Ut. 2d

276:
"Elementary it is that in construing contracts
we seek to determine the intentions of the parties.
But it is also ele1nentary and of extreme practical importance that we hold contracting parties
to their clear and understandable language deliberately committed to writing and endorsed by
thein as signatories thereto. Were this not so,
business one with another among our citizens,
v{ould be relegated to the chaotic, and the basic
purpose of the law to supply enforceable rules
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of conduct for the maintPnance and improvement
of an ordPrly society's welfare and progress would
find itself impotent. It is not unreasonable to
hold one responsible for language which he him~df espouses. Such language is the only implement he gives us to fashion a deternunation as
to the intt,ntions of the parties. Under such cir<·nm~tances, we should not be required to embosom any request that we ignore that very
language. This is as it should be. 'The rule
Pxcluding matters outside the four corners of a
clear, understandable document, is a fair one,
and one's contentions concerning his intent should
Pxh·nd no further than his own clear expressions."

lrestern Development Co. v. Nell, 288 P. 2d 452,
rt. :!<l 11~:

±

" ... where the intention of the parties can
he ascertained from the instrument, arbitrary
rules of law as to construction will not be invoked.
Haynes v. Hunt, 96 Ut. 345, 85 P. 2d 861."

1-t~

Driggs v. Ftah State Teachers Retirement Board,
P. ~d 657, 105 l;t. 417:
"Our own court referred to this same principle in Schofield v. Zion's C.l\LI., supra, at page
~SS of the Utah report, 39 P. 2d at page 345: 'It
is elemental, in construing a contract, that its
purpose, its nature, and subject-matter should
be considered. A construction giving an instrument a legal effect to accomplish its purpose will
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be adopted when it can reasonably be done, and
between two possible constructions that will be
adopted which establishes a valid contract.'"
It is not disputed that the Bill of Sale and Agreement
were drafted by Mr. Irwin Clawson, attorney for the
Salt Lake Transfer Company at that time. Equally,
the plaintiffs do not dispute that they knew or could
have known of the contract provision for 28 years and
yet they accepted its benefits for that period of time
before they raised any questions.
We do not find within these documents such ambiguities as would require the trial court to construe
language adverse to defendants. The plain, clear and
ordinary language of "buy and sell" means exactly that.
No future sale was contemplated, intended or expressed.
Merely a delayed payment date ·was left for the future.
That the plaintiffs knew and understood their
Agreement or had an ample opportunity to know its
contents and import for 28 years before raising a question, is shown by s01ne of their testimony. None testified
as to any refusal to give copies to them. :Mrs. l\1:cDonald
said that she'd never asked for a copy (R. 150). Mrs.
Hannibal testified that she, in 1932, had asked her older
brothers, Lou and Cleve (two of the plaintiffs) if it
was alright to sign and had been told "yes" (R. 166-67)
and later she received a copy of the Agre(~Inent (Exhibit
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P-B). ~I r. Cleveland J(. Sims "Cleve" testified that
n ('opy of thP Agreement was given to him at the ti1ne
of signing (H. H)9).
~Irs.

Hannibal, who then lived in Everett, Washington, tPstit'iPd that after she was home, she took her copy
of tht> Agreement "to the finest attorneys on the Coast"
(H.. 17~). None expressed any misunderstanding of the
tt>rllls during this long period. The parties were in freqtwnt communication with each other. Plaintiffs themst~ln's characterized their relationship with George and
:\1. K. as a "more united family, the most clanish family
l hnvP ever known" (l\1rs. Malquist R. 213). Regular
('lweks were remitted monthly to the plaintiffs and annual state1nents were sent to them as "creditors of Salt
Lake Transfer Co." (Exhibit D-F) for 28 years, still
no complaints or contentions of a different intent or
understanding.
\Y e submit that the plaintiffs knew they had made
a sale, knew they were not partners, accepted and retained the benefits of their Agreement for 28 years
before complaining and thus estopped themselves from
now attempting to vary the terms of their Agreement.
Their oral, self-serving declarations that they thought
they were partners is negatived by their conduct. No such
parole evidence should have been admitted to vary their
1~l;i~ Agreement.
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POINT IY
THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT NO PARTNERSHIP EVER EXISTED BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANT'S; AND PLAINTIFFS HAVE ESTOPPED THEMSELVES FROM AS8ERTING A PARTNERSHIP WITH DEFENDANTS.

After 28 years of dormancy, plaintiffs have suddenly asserted themselves as "partners." The obvious reason
is that such would reap for them a share in the prt>sent
assets of Salt Lake Transfer Company as they have
increased in value. ·This scheme would relieve plaintiff's
from their sale made in 1932. The plaintiffs, thus, had
individually and collectively great financial temptations
before them to claim the relationship of partners with
their brothers George and l\L l(.
None denied the execution of the Agreeuwnt in 1932,
where they sold and the "present Salt Lake Transfer
Company" (George and l\f. K.) purchased the fractional
interests given to planitiffs four days before by their
father's Bill of Sale. Not one testified that he or she
had participated in the n1anage1nent of the c01npany from
that day forward. None of the plaintiffs had owned any
share in the company before or after said April 19:3~
Agreement, except for four days, between their fatlwr'~
Bill of Sale on April 21, 19·32 and their own Agreement
on April 6, 1932. No partnership agn·t>1nent was ev<'l'
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~ignt>d

hy plaintiffs, but the actual partners had such
partnPrship agreements and had duly filed their Affidavit~ of doing business under the assumed name of Salt
Lake Transfer Company in 1932 (Exhibit D-'T) and in
19~7 (Exhibit D-e). In the face of such facts and their
prot'P~~P<l love for their elder brother, George, one
would think that after 28 years the plaintiffs would be
uttPrly embarrassed to attempt to be considered as
partners at this late date and to demand a liquidation
of the finn. Two items of evidence were introduced in
their futile effort to overturn their 1932 Agreement and
claim a~ partnPrs;

(a) self-serving parole declarations that they
thought they were partners (attempt to vary the terms
of their 1932 Agreement) ; and
(b) Income tax returns of the cmnpany after 1941,
which referred to the distribution of the shares of profits
- (interest under the 1932 Agreement) as going in part
to the plaintiffs as "partners" (Exhibit P-K and P-J).
One of the definitions of a partnership is "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners
a business for profit." 48-1-3 e.C.A. 1953. In light of
this language, let us evaluate the relationship created in
1~):~:2 by the Agreen1ent signed by the plaintiffs. Except
for the parole declarations of the plaintiffs, no seinhlanre of a partnership existed. The plaintiffs sold as
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"vendors" to "the present Salt Lake Transfer Company,
a co-partnership consisting of George A. Sims and Milton K. Sims, vendees . . . " (Exhibit P-B). The next
paragraph refers to plaintiffs selling their interest
(which they had received from their father four days
before) in "the former Salt Lake Transfer Company to
"the present Salt Lake Transfer Company, a co-partnership, vendee."
The preamble refers to the three partners in the old
Salt Lake Transfer Company, George H. (the father),
George A. and Milton K. Sims and then describes the
father's Bill of Sale of April 2, 1932 and then state~
that the plaintiffs, "children of George H. Sims who
have not been in the partnership," desire to sell their
interests "to the two remaining partners and the latter
are willing to purchase the same and have organized a
partnership hereinafter described as the present Salt
Lake Transfer Company." These plaintiffs were hard
put in trying to contend that they were partners in
Salt Lake Transfer Company after that. The trial court
properly found that they were not such partners.
The remaining contentions of plaintiffs on this
abortive partnership claim, seems tied to the combination of payment to plaintiffs of a per cent of the profits
and that their nmnes appeared on tax notices after 1941.
We've made it clear before that this percentage of profits
was a method of interest pay1nent namely 1/27th each
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of tht> ··net monthly profits, if any'' and in the same
pnragraph stah•s that after demand of payment, "he
or :-;Itt> shall be entitled to interest on the sale price at
~ix }H'l' <'Pnt IH'l' anntun until paid." This manifests a
('l'(lditor-dPhtor relationship.
r~xhibits

P-J, P-I{ are income tax returns of the

parhwrship, beginning with the calendar year 1932 and
continuing on. An inspection of the 1933 returns shows
the two partiwrs, George A. and Milton K. Sims plus
"mi~e. minor inten'st," which referred to the distribution
to the plaintiffs. The same designation was used in 1934
and Hl:~3. In 1936 there was designated "interest credited
to mi~<·. members."
rrhe 1937 return did not indicate any credit to plaintiff:5. The 1938 return showed as partners only, George
.\.and ~[ilton I{. Sims. The 1939 return showed the same
two names, then, with the designation "others (see
schedule att.),'' then the names of the six plaintiffs were
reflected. 1940 followed the identical procedure. 1941
showed the two partners George A. Sims and M. K. Sims,
along with the plaintiffs under schedule 'J,' "partners
share of income and credits." Basically this same pattern
then followed for the remainder of the years until after
the death of :JI. l(. Sims in 1959.

It is to be recalled that the change in showing the
nanlt•s of all of the plaintiff's under the schedule was
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explained, first by defendant, Grant G. Si1ns (record

281):
Q.... "Did you do anything at that time to
complain about listing in the income tax return
under the heading of schedule I, Partners' Share
of Income and Credits where it says schedule
attached showing presumably all twelve partners;
I assume that didn't alarm you f'
A .... "Throughout the - -"
Q. "First, would you answer my question. I
asked you if that concerned or alarmed you and
then make any explanation you want, please."

MR. PUGSLEY: "Just a moment. The question covers a lot of territory. I think the witness
ought to be allowed to answer in his own words."
Q. (By Mr. Berol) "Very well. Please go
ahead in your own words."

A. "There has been doubt as to handling
this distribution of profits. In 1937 the family

accepted a note. In many instances the reporting
thereof has been a long term indebtedness, interest on note -"

Q. "l\fr. Silns, I'1n talking about this return
of 1946."
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A. ·· \Vt>ll, I'm leading up to that. You have
me wlwthPr or not I ·was concerned. I'n1
IPa<ling up to an~wPr you how I was alarmed and
how I have been disturbed over it. I went to my
partner Ebner and I asked him why there has
hP~n a varianeP in reporting this, and he told
lllP that at that ti1ne there was a letter from the
lntPrnal Revenue to put this distribution of profits someplace, and they designated it as a "Special
Partner." Prior to 1940 it showed various ways
of accounting it. The Internal Revenue, as I consider the1n, are not desirous of knowing how it
comes to them except how much and under what
ela~~ifications. And they gave us the term ''Spe<'ial Partner." Not an agreement or anything
PbP, and for accounting purposes some auditor
in the Internal Revenue Service placed those
words in the mouth of our accountant and they
havP been carried forward as such."
a~kP<l

Elmer L. Sims testified that he had been the office
manager for the past fifteen years and had become
familiar with the books and records and had signed annual reports for the Interstate Commerce Commission
of th~ ~tatP of ·[tah, (Record 294) and that at no time
were tllP fmnily me1nbers, who were the plaintiffs, shown
a~ partners on such reports to the Interstate Commerce
Conm1ission.
Exhibits D-0, D-P, D-Q, are photostats of a permit
and two certificates issued by the Interstate Commerce
Commission to the Salt Lake Transfer Company in
1941, 1943, and 1948, re::;pechvely. The first two bear
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the names "George A. Sims and M. K. Sims, a partnership, doing business as Salt Lake Transfer Company,
Salt Lake City, Utah," and the third one shows George
A. Sims, M. IC. Sims, Elmer L. Sims, and G. Grant Sims,
a partnership, doing business as Salt Lake Transfer
Company, Salt Lake City, lTtah.
Exhibits D-R and D-S are certified copies of documents issued by the Public Service Commission of Utah,
the first being based on a hearing in 1938 and duly
issued in 1939. On page two finds:
"On the 6th day of l\iarch, 1934, George A. Sims
and Milton K. Sims, a partnership doing business at
Salt Lake City, Utah in the firm name of the Salt Lake
Transfer Company, filed an application with the Public
Utilities Commission for a permit under the provisions
of Chapter 53, Laws of Utah, 1933, to operate motor
vehicles for hire as a "contract carrier of property" in
intrastate commerce over and upon "all highways and
any where in the State of Utah." This application was
docketed as Case 15-1-!," and on page 3 finds:
"On April 3, 1936, and subsequent to the enactment
of Chapter 65, Laws of Utah, 1935, George A. Sims
and Milton K. Si1ns, doing business as the Salt Lake
Transfer Company, again filed an application for a contract carrier pern1it under the provisions of Chapter 65,
Laws of Utah, 1935, in which they sought authority to
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l•ngage in the transportation of property on occasional
hauls ovt>r all the highways of the State of Utah, (Case
~o. 1849). On the same day, the Public Utilities Commission without a }H·aring granted to said applicants,
Contrad Carrier Permit No. 123, authorizing them to
pngage in the transportation of property by motor vehiclP ovPr all highways of the State of Utah without
any rt>strictions as to commodities or routes," and on
the appointed order, being Certificate of Convenience
and Xt>ePssity #51'2, issues the certificate to "George
A. Sims and .M. K. Sims, a partnership, doing business
as ~alt Lake Transfer Company."
Exhibit D-S is a report and tentative order issued
hy the Public Service Commission of Utah, August 24,
1948 "and therein it recites the formation of the partnership in 1947, of George A. Sims, M. K. Sims, Elmer
L. Sims, and Grant G. Sims, dba as a partnership under
the name of Salt Lake Transfer Company" and transfL·r~ to the said partnership of four individuals, the
t•xaet operating rights then held by George A Sims
and ~f. l(. Si1ns, a partnership dba Salt Lake Transfer
Company.
Our Partnership Act, Section 48-1-4 (3) reads:
''The sharing of gross return does not of
itself establish a partnership, whether or not
the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in any property from which
the returns are derived."
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and Section 48-1-4 ( 4) (d) reads:
"The receipt by a person of a share of the
profits of a business is prima facie evidence that
he is a partner in the business, but no such inference shall be drawn if such profits were received in payment:
(d) As interest on a loan, though the
amounts of payment vary ·with the profits of the
business."
Now this parole evidence as to a partnership wherein under direct examination by their own counsel, each
parroted the thought that he or she was a partner,
was negatived by their adJ.nissions that in the 28 year
period not one had in any manner, participated in manageement or even attempted to so participate. The burden of proof ·was upon these plaintiffs to prove partnership. Benson v. Rozzelle, 85 rtah 582, 39 P.2d 1113.
In that case an accounting and dissolution was sought
and the partnership relationship was denied. The Utah
Supreme Court held, among other things, that there was
no partnership. "A partnership agree1nent, like any
other express contract, requires a meeting of the minds
of the parties thereto." "In an action by alleged partner
for accounting and dissolution of partnership, plaintiff
has burden of proving the existence of tlw partnership."
In our case, no 1neeting of u1inds occurred as to
the plaintiffs becoming partners and they certainly have
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failed in their burden of proof. They did not convince
thP trial Court and no substantial evidence of partnership appears. in the record.
POINT V
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PROVE THEIR ALLEGATION THAT THEIR 1932 AGREEMENT IS UNENFORCEABLE OR VOID BECAUSE OF FRAUD, MIST'AKE OR UNDUE INFLUENCE AND THE COURT PROPERLY FOUND
THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS VALID AND ENFORCEABLE.

r.rhe plaintiffs were singularly silent as to any allegations of fraud, mistake or undue influence in their
two romplaints and their amended cornplaint. It was
not until the actual day of pre-trial that the plaintiffs'
attorney presented a document designated as "Plaintiffs'
Statement of Facts, Contentions and Issues." There
the n'ry first contentions were "fraud, rnistake and
undue influence" and this bombshell was followed by
~t~\·eral diverse and inconsistent positions relating to
partnership or non-partnership status.
This fraud clain1 n1ust have been a surprise to
plaintiffs as they did not even know they were suing
th~'ir brother George. Plaintiff, ~[rs. Hannibal was
a~ked

about signing the Agreement on April 6, 1932 and

told of asking her older brothers Cleve and Lou if they

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40
thought it alright for her to sign and then, in response
to their approval, she signed (R. 174). She testified
in part:

Q. "You not only trusted George, but you
also trusted Cleve and you trusted Lou, didn't
you~"

A. "Why certainly."

Q. "And you still love and trust and respect
them all, don't you f'
A. "That's right."

Q. "Even though you are suing George and
the others f'
A. "I'm not suing George. I'm suing the
Salt Lake ·Transfer Company, I think. Isn't
that right~"
When she was asked about her intention to sue her
brother George, her own counsel objected and asserted
that she was bound by his actions.
When "Cleve," plaintiff Cleveland l{elly Sims,
testified he was asked about his willingness to be bound
by that 1932 Agreement, signed by hiln and his coplaintiffs and attempts were made to ask him about any
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«·laim of fraud. On<'P again, his own counsel intervened
and protP~h·<l that the plaintiff could not disclaim fraud
t'VPn if he wantPd to as he was bound because his attorm•y said then• was fraud (R. 201). Apparently his
attorney is the only one that knows of any semblance
of fraud and was afraid to let his six clients approach
the subjPet after their repeated declarations of love
for their brother, George. This is a unique and wholly
untenable position that a party cannot disclaim or withdraw from the, apparently, unauthorized allegations of
fraud made by his attorney.

\\'hat is the rneasure of proof required of the plaintiffs on this fraud and undue influence issue~ The court
at pre-trial (R. 99) said that such contentions must be
~hown "hy clear ond convincing proof." The Amended
Findings determined that the 1932 Agreement "is not
void or unenforceable on the grounds of fraud, mistake
or undue influence" (R. 111).
One of the more recent cases from your court has
held a~ to this issue that fraud must be pleaded and
proreil aR to tlw basic elen1ents ; D upl Pr v. Yates, 351
I'.~d ()~-J., 10 rtah 2d 251. Those elements are spelled
out in Parr Y. Parrish, 122 rtah 141, 247 P.2d 273
as follows:
(2) "This being an action in deceit based
on fraudulent misrepresentations, the burden was
upon plaintiffs to prove all of the essential eleSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ments thereof. These are: (1) That a representation was made ; ( 2) concerning a presently
existing material fact; ( 3) which was false; (4)
which the representor either (a) knew to be false,
or (b) made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such
representation; ( 5) for the purpose of inducing
the other party to act upon it; ( 6) that the other
party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its
falsity; (7) did in fact rely upon it; (8) and was
thereby induced to act; (9) to his injury and
damage. See Stuck v. Delta Land & \Vater Co.,
63 Utah 495, 227 P. 791; Jones v. Pingree, 73,
Utah 190, 273 P. 303; 23 An1. Jur. 773; 37 C.J.S.,
Fraud, Section 3, p. 215."

That is the yardstick ''re apply to the various items
in the findings and judgment of the trial court concerning which issues are raised on this appeal."
Now we know that the plaintiffs are going to claim
that the "clear and convincing proof" level does not
apply as they now assert some confidential relationship.
We should examine that claim as relating to their April
6, 1932 Agreement. Plaintiffs all testified that their
father had just been buried that date and the family
returned to the hon1e after the burial for food and to
visit. George A. Sims, their oldest brother, invited them
all to come into the fan1ily parlor, but to leave the inlaws out. This was done and the Agreement was presented to the1n for reading and signing. Each approached this differently as is shown by their testimony.
All had love for and confidence in George. All knew
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that he had "run" the Salt Lake Transfer Company for
~1'\'t-ral years, along with their brother .Milton K., while
tlwi r father had gone on two missions for his Church
nnd had been IP~~ active in his declining years.
Two of the female plaintiffs testified that they were
~till grief stricken and paid little attention to reading
it. Obviously the 1nale plaintiffs read and understood
it~ language. None of these were young children, the
"girl~" wPre all mature, married women and the "boys"
were businessmen. "Cleve" to whom they turned for
counsel in signing, tells us that he had been an agent
for New York Life Insurance Company for many years
(R. 19~) and Louis K. testified that his experience with
that company was even more extensive and that he had
sold S,OOO policies, been in the first 10 highest agents in
the l "!".::-;. for many years and was 73rd in the U.S. the
preceding

~'ear

(R. 210).

\Yhat did Louis K. say about the fan1ily going into
the room and excluding the in-laws when considering
tlw Agreen1ent, ''perfectly proper" (R. 205). He said
he was capable of reading the document and "I think I
understood everything" ( R. 213). All of the plaintiffs
professed great love for and confidence in George, then
and now. Plaintiff Grace S. Malquist volunteered,
"George has shown nothing but kindness and consideration for all of us all of his life.''
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Now their counsel would twist this into something
wicked and evil. Certainly they loved and trusted their
brother, George. He has never betrayed this trust. He
and Milton on that day, bought from them and the plaintiffs sold to the "present Salt Lake Transfer Company"
the interests which the family had held for four days.
The testimony was that their father's children "came
along every two years" so that was no great difference
in the ages of the parties. Three of the girls had their
husbands in the next roon1. The fourth one, Irma, went
back to Washington after the funeral and discussed the
Agreement with her husband and "the finest attorney
on the Coast" (R. 178). Not one of them has testified
as to any false statement made by George, unless you
consider the statement that he ·wanted the Agreement
signed because he wanted to run the business, a false
statement. None of the male plaintiffs contend that they
were unable to know the tenns of the Agree1nent.
At the ti1ne of trial, George was well over SO years
of age and he was unable to recollect back to the 1932
transactions as to details. Taking advantage of this,
some of his younger brothers and sisters, the youngest
being about 60 years of age, have tried to modify their
Agreement by saying that they understood George to
say he was going to run the business for them and they
would be partners. This is directly opposite to the language and intent of the Agremnent which was read and
signed by them on April 6, 1932.
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Cmm~P l

also desire to urge that smnething sinister
1':\isted in the I' ad that 1\1 r. Irwin Clawson had prepan·<l thP Agreement for Salt Lake Transfer Company
and Ueorge had it there to be signed right after the
funeral. (\,rtainly someone must prepare an Agreement and
timing

~omeone

wa~

must present it for signatures. (The

dictated hy the death of the father, April 3rd,

the formation of a new partnership by George and Milt
the next day and the fact that the rnajority of plaintiffs
lin•d out of the state of Utah and were here only for
the funeral.) Do plaintiffs contend that they would not
hnvP signed it the next day or the next week or month?

Xo intimation of this is in the record. Louis K., who
\\"a~

-t!

just a few )·ears younger than George and about

yPnJ·~

of age in 1932, testified that no one forced

him to sign, in fact, "one one asked me." (R. 212).
X o unfairness has been demonstrated by plaintiffs.

In Perry Y. ;.l!cC'ollkic, 1 Utah 2d 189, 264 P.2d 852,
tlw rule is announced that if because of friendship of the
parties a fiduciary relationship exists, the fiduciary
must show that the dealings were fair and in good faith.
Yiewed in light of the Depression tirne, we see nothing
unfair in the proposal rnade and accmnplished that day
by the Agreen1ent. Plaintiffs for four days, by reason
of their father's April 2d Bill of Sale, had owned a
minority interest in partnership assets.
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The two surviving partners bought and the plaintiffs sold such interests. ·The purchase price was to be
set at the value as of the Bill of Sale date as prescribed
by their father in that Bill of Sale which said, "tlw
value of the same shall be appraised by Gladys S. Bullough and George A. Sims and the figure set by these
two shall be binding upon the withdrawing Grantee."
(Exhibit P-A). There was nothing unfair in that.
Gladys is one of the plaintiffs and George is a defendant. Each side was to be represented so no unfairness
of price could be asserted.
As the money ·was not available then to pay the
purchase price to plaintiffs as ''-withdrawing Grantees,"
1/27th of the net profits was to be paid by way of interest until the purchase price was paid. Actually this has
been a suin far in excess of nonnal interest, so no unfair
advantage of plaintiffs has been taken there. George
and Milton K. agreed with plaintiffs to a monthly salary
of $200.00 each. This level of compensation has been
followed faithfully by then1 for 27 years until the death
of Milton K. and up to trial as to GeorgP.
In conclusion of this phase, we desire to emphasize
that there was no pleading of fraud, etc., but only a
"contention" of plaintiffs' attorneys, there was no proof
of fraud, there was no fiduciary relationship, there was
no unfairness in the Agreement. Had any plaintiff
thought otherwise, he or she could have asked for their
Inoney at any time bPtween 1932 and 1960, but none did.
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POINT VI
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING 'THE PURCHASE PRICE VALUATION AS OF JUNE 3, 1960 AND PARTICULARLY ERRED IN IGNORING THE VALU~T'ION SET
IN 1947 BY THOSE DESIGNATED IN THE 1932 BILL OF
SALE AND AGREEMENT.

The second phase of this case was a separate trial
to determine the valuation of the interests sold by plaintiffs to defendants in 1932. The Court had already entered it~ Findings and Judgn1ent (R. 109-115) that the
.\gn·Pnwnt wa~ valid and enforceable. However, the
('ourt determined that the sale price was not to be
fixPd until tlw date of a demand for pay1nent by plainti rr~, which was June 3, 1960, the date of filing this
action.
Throughout the 28 years, defendants have known
that some day they must pay the purchase price and
until then interest at the rate of 1/27th of the net profits
must be paid to each defendant. The books and records
rdlt•d annual and often Inore frequent interest remittaneP~. The plaintiffs were referred to as "Creditors
of :Salt Lake Transfer Company (Exhibit D-F in the
statements sent out annually.
Defendants have at all times contended that the
valuation as of 1932 was the purchase price set by the
Agreement because that is when plaintiffs ·withdrew as
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contemplated by the father's Bill of Sale. After the
War, G. Grant Sims, son of George A., returned to Utah
and considered leaving his position in the East and buying into Salt Lake Transfer Company by purchase of
a part of his father's half interest. At that time a review
of the Agreement and Bill of Sale were had and th(-•y
sought to tie down this 1932 purchase price to a fixed
figure so he would know what he was buying from his
father.
The language requ1nng valuation by Gladys S.
Bullough and George A. Silns was noted. This was
not optional but was required by the father's Bill of
Sale and the plaintiffs by their Agreement "approve of
such Bill of Sale and of the method therein set for
valuing the share owned by George H. Sims at the
time of the execution of such Bill of Sale." (Exhibit
P-A and P-B).
Thus, ·with the method of valuing being fixed and
the time of valuing set, ~teps were taken in 1947 to have
the two designated by their father and approved by the
plaintiffs to set all the 19,32 value. Exhibit D-H and
D-I are the result of this request. Exhibit D-I is a reconstructed Balance Sheet at April 2, 1932. Plaintiff
Gladys S. Bullough signed this along with George A.
Prior to signing this, her husband, David H. Bullough went to the office of Salt Lake Transfer Company and checked and YPrified this statement. He was
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tlw accountant who had maintained the company books
prior to 1930 and continuously until called into military
:-;l'!'vi<'P in 1940. Thus he was thoroughly familiar with
t hP hook~ and rPrords. In 1947 he had returned home
a ~I ajor, was in an independent business and in no way
under any compulsion from or obligation to Salt Lake
Transfer Company to verify the figures.

Ulady~ tPstified that she knew of her husband's
familiarity with the 1932 books and reeords of Salt
Lake Transfer Company and she relied upon his repre~wntations to her and his investigation of the values
when ~:'he signed the valuations in 1947 (R. 231, 235-36).
Exhibit D-I is the actual balance sheet as of April 2,
1932 and Exhibit D-ll is a ~~ emorandum which recites
the Bill of Sale, the Agree1nent and that Gladys and
Ueorge had investigated the values and had reached
an agreement as to the same and then established such
at $3,614.41 for each share owned by the plaintiffs.
This was signed by them and witnessed by her husband, David H. Bullough. If nothing else, this valuation
hy Jl r8. Bullough of her interest and the similar interP~t~ of the other plaintiffs is a binding admission against
interest. .. A declaration by an owner of property stating the value thereof is admissible where value is an
i~:-:nP ... ~0 Am . .J 11 r. -~90.
Should she be allowed to renege from this~ We
think not. Should the other five plaintiffs be allowed
to ignore the n1ethod of valuation prescribed by their
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father in his Bill of Sale to them and adopted by them?
We think not. This method of valuation is akin to a
condition precedent which adheres to the claim of each
plaintiff as it is part and parcel of the Bill of Sale by
which their only interests came to them and reposed in
them for four days.
Mr. Bullough acknowledged that he was very familiar with the Salt Lake 'Transfer Company and its
books and that in 1947 and before his wife signed the
Balance Sheet and Memorandum he verified the figures
with Mr. Grant Gay and Mr. Elmer L. Sims at the
company office ( R. 243). He then testified that he advised his wife to sign the Balance Sheet and the l\Iemorandum (R. 246). His testimony is confirmed by his
wife and by Mr. Grant Sims who told of l\fr. Bullough
checking the audit, discussing the details and the signing (R. 256-259). The fact that the valuation as of
April 19,32 was made in 1947 instead of 1960 should
make no difference as the 1932 value was clearly ascertainable from the books and records. The element
of good will was not included in Exhibit D-I, the Balance Sheet, as Mr. Bullough testified that "no great
value was left on the intangibles." (R. 246). On this
phase, the record shows that said date preceded any
issuance of certificates or permits by the State of Utah
or the Interstate Commerce Commission.
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The trial Court therefore should have awarded
judgnwnt to the plaintiffs for the sum thus set by the
<lP~i~mttPd individuals plus any unpaid interest. No
di~pntP has PVPr existed as to the unpaid interest, in
l'ad, that suin has now been fully paid to plaintiffs. The
trial court erred in valuing the assets sold in 1932 at
tlwi r 1960 figure. The inconsistency of this position is
demonstrated by the fact that though all six sold and
convPyPd their interests in 1932 and agreed to have
their brother and sister value such as of the 1932 Bill
of ~ale, ~-d, if the Court were right, any one of the
plaintiffs could have demanded their money at differl'nt times and each would receive a different purchase
prieP for the smne undivided interest. Such was not the
intent of the Bill of Sale or Agreement.

POINT VII
THE OOURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
VALUATION AGREED UPON BETWEEN THE PARTIES
IN 1959 FOLLOWING DE,A'TH OF D. K. SIMS.

\Yithout admitting the propriety of valuing the
193~ interest at a later date, ·we urge that the Court
should weigh as persuasive evidence the uncompleted
transaction wherein following the demise of Milton K.
~im~, George A.. offered to plaintiffs $18,000.00 each
(this included the lmpaid interest) and the plaintiffs
agreed such to be reasonable valuation and fair and
accepted the offer ( R. 187). This offer of plaintiffs
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to effectuate a settlement at a certain price is admissible evidence against them as an admission in fixing
the value at or near the time when the offer was made.
( 20 Am. J ur 491 and citations.) Another contemporaneous valuation was the sale and purchase of the same
fractional interest made by plaintiffs' brother, John,
in 1960 for $10,000.00 (representing the 19'32 value plus
accrued interest). ·This was an arms length transaction
between two businessmen (R. 769). Such is the only
contemporaneous settlement actually completed on the
identical interests owned by each of the plaintiffs. By
referring to this as a settlement, we do so only on the
assumption that the unvalued goodwill omitted from
the 1932 Balance Sheet might possibly have some minor
worth which would account for the difference between
the $8500.00 principal and inter<->st and the $10,000.00
paid.
POINT VIII
ASSUMING A 1960 PURCHASE PRICE VALUATION,
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT
AS IT USED A SALVAGE VALUE BASIS WITHOUT ANY
ALLOWANCE FOR LIQUIDATION OR SALVAGE EXPENSE.

At the trial of the second phase of the case, evidence
of accountants and appraisers was taken in pursuance
of the Court's earlier order, and the Court took evidence
from plaintiffs ·witnesses on the June 1960 valuation of
thP Salt Lake Transfer assets. Sin1s Realty, Inc. is a
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corporation to which the partners had conveyed the
n·nlty owned and used by Salt Lake Transfer Company, hence, it was stipulated that if a 1960 valuation

to hP used by the Court, the assets of Sims Realty
should hP included. By inadvertence, references are
made to June 30 in the evidence rather than June 3,

WPI'P

1960 the actual date of filing the complaint by plaintiffs
in this case.

\V e shall reVIew the various bases for valuation
which were placed in evidence. There are four possible
approaches for the Court to take in determining the
amount due to the plaintiffs in this case. These are as
follow~:

A. Yaluation as of April 1932, plus accumulated
unpaid net earnings since that date in lieu of
interest.

B. Yaluation as a going concern as of June 3,
1960.
C. Salvage value as of June 3, 1960.

D. Yaluation based on contemporary "sale" or on
ta..""< valuation.
~-\..

raluation as of April 6, 1932.
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In its Order of May 3, 1962, the Court rejected the
contention of the defendants that the amount which
should be recovered by the plaintiffs is the agreed valuation as of April 6, 1932, plus their undrawn share of
the earnings since that date. This ruling, howevPr, is
still subject to revision. After tlw defendants paid to
the plaintiffs $48,000.00 to apply on the ultirnate judgrnent in this case, an interim appeal was taken to the
Supreme Court. The defendants resisted the appeal on
the grounds that there was no final or appealable
judgment. Apparently the Supreme Court agreed with
this position, because it declined to entertain the appeal.
Without wanting to unduly labor this mattvr, we
wish to point out that the Court has found that the
plaintiffs are creditors and not partners. That being
so, it appears that their values should lw fixed as of
the tirne they became creditors. A creditor's position
of debt-claim does not grow as to the principal, but only
by interest accurnulations. In this case, as the Court
has found that the plaintiffs are entitled to earnings
in lieu of interest, the position that should be taken appears clear. The plaintiffs are entitled to their value
of the property as of April 6, 1932, plus accumulated
but undrawn earnings since that date.

B. l' aluations as a Goillg CoJiccrn.
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Plaintiffs prP~Pnted no evidence to the court as
to the valuation of Salt Lake Transfer or Sims Realty
Company on a g-oing concern basis. The sole evidence
in thi~ regard can1e from Professor Frank Stuart of
the Univt>r~ity of Utah, Business Research Bureau (R.
li~:q. BPeau~P Salt Lake Transfer and Sims Realty in
et'ft>et form one composite operating unit, Professor
Htuart arrived at a valnP of both companies as a
~ingle unit and as a going concern, based upon the
rapitalization of their earnings. As Professor Stuart
tt~~tified, this is what the property in question is worth
a~ a business which is not to be broken up into its compositP parts but sold as a business which is going to
rontinue in operation and which is going to continue to
NUn a return for the owners. It was Professor Stuart's
opinion, based upon this approach, that the two companiP~ combined were worth approximately $135,000.00
(R. u~7-629). The plaintiffs, therefore, under this approach should each be entitled to recover 6o/3 of the
$1:~5,000.00, plus, of course, their accu1nulated and undrawn earnings. The sum to which this would amount
will be summarized later in the appendix to this brief.
l'. Salragr ralue.

It was stated by Professor Stuart on cross-examina-

tion, and indeed it can be concluded by the Court in
tlw ahsencP of such a statement, that there are tin1es
when tlw cmnposite value of the assets of a cmnpany,
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less its liabilities, are worth more than the company
value as a going concern. In such a case two things are
evident - ( 1) the owners of the company would be bettPr
off if it ceased to do business and proceeded to liquidate
the assets and invest the money in another enterprise;
and (2) the intangibles of the firm, i.e., goodwill, operating rights, etc., have no value at all.
One thing, however, should he borne in mind, and
that is that the salvage value of a firm is not arrived
at merely by valuing the individual 1naterial assets and
deducting therefrom the liabilities, because this ignore~
entirely the question of the cost of salvaging a firm,
\vhich may be much or little, depending upon the nature
of a firm. We do not wish to imply to the Court that
it would take overly long or would be unduly expensive
to liquidate the Salt Lake TransfPr and Sims Realty
assets. However, it cannot be doubted that considerable
time and considerable expense would be entailed in such
a proceeding, and if this Court is to take the position
that this cmnpany is nwre valuable for salvage than
as a going concern and proceed to value it on that
basis, then due consideration Inust be given to the cost
of salvaging. The salvage and other values considered
by the trial Court are :
1. ROLLING STOCK
There is a great variance between the parties in
regard to the evaluation of the rolling stock of Salt
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LakP Tran~t'Pr Con1pany. Plaintiffs called a l\Ir. Phillips
1 I:. :~S~) and It rl-W), who valued the trucks and tractors
at $1:-ll.IOO.OO, and a .Jir. Paramore (R. 425), who valued
t hP t railPrs at $102,750.00. ~I r. Grant Sims valued trucks,
t rad or~ and trailers all together at a total of $122,996.77.
'fhe Court'~ ~I <>morandum set such at $175,000.00.

All of thP~P witnesses were working with the same
list of equipment and all of their appraisals were based
upon the same original costs, as these were taken from
the books and records of the company. The difference
in their appraisals appears to result from the difference
in depreciation adopted hy the various appraisers. Plaintiffs applied to the new price of the equipment the deln·eciation schedule set forth in Exhibit P-10, whereas
the defendants applied the schedule reflected in Exhibit
D-:!7 (R. 7-tH).

It cannot be doubted that, except for such bias as
rP~nlt from his being a party to the suit, Mr. Grant
~im~ is the best qualified of any of the appraisers so
far as rolling stock is concerned. His long experience
in this field, both with Salt Lake Transfer and with
Burlington Transportation Cmnpany (R. 745), has
qualified him uniquely to appraise accurately the valuation of tractors, trucks and trailers. In view of the
well n•cognized tendency of "impartial" expert appraist·rs

to color their appraisals to suit the interests of the

partit>~ by

whmn they are hired, the relative accuracy

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

58
of Exhibits P-10 and D-27 should be weighted by evidence in the case other than the ability or self-intere~ts
of the various experts.
This Court can take judicial notice that the rat<•
of depreciation tends to decline rather than increase
as the equipment gets older. The most damning refutation of Mr. Phillips figures, however, came from his
own lips. He stated that in arriving at his valuation
he had used as an aid the Truck Blue Book, which on
the first day of his testimony he did not haYe in Court
with him. After a day's recess he got this book, however,
and counsel cross-examined him in regard to the valuation shown by the Blue Book, and particularly in regard
to the rate of depreciation as established hy tlw Bhw
Book when applied to like equipment of varying ages.
By taking a typical piece of equip1nent through a sevenyear period to the age of seven years, the greatest age
indicated in the Blue Book, and cmnparing the values in
each year, it becan1e apparent that his Exhibit P-10
was valueless.
The plaintiffs did considerable pious breast-beating
in regard to the valuation of the rolling stock by showing in the case of son1e of the nt>wer equip1nent it
actually valued it higher than the Blue Book figure.
This means little, however, as there were only a very
few pieces of eqnip1nent in that category. The great
bulk of the Salt Lake Transfer rolling stock was in the
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catPg-ory wlwn· :Mr. Phillips' appraisal "·as grossly inflated IH·<·an~P of the understat<'ment of depreciation
t-stabli~lw<l frmn his own lips. Exhibit D-28 prepared
under t lw direction of l\lr. Ebner Sims applies to the
purrha~l' pri<'<' of P:.wh pi<'CP of t~quip1nent the depreciation ratP tP~t ified to hy .JI r. Grant Sims, the depreciation rah• rPj<'eh•<l h~· ~I r. Phillips, hut substantiated by
Jl r. Phillip~· own testimony.
:\lr. Parimore's Pxhibit valuing the trailers, Exhibit
I,-~, turned out to be one of the most carelessly preparPd docmnent~ that can be ilnagined. As pointed out
hy j( r. Grant Sims in his testinwny, l\lr. Pari1nore in
l·:xhihit P--t. valued quit<' a nu1nber of the used pieces
ot' Pquipment at a price actually above their purchase
prirP. The most unusual thing he did, however, was to
plarP different valuations, in a number of instances,
on identical eqnip1nent. If 1Ir. Parimore had actually
:-;l•t~n the equipment as of the date his appraisal was
eft'l·l'tiYt>, such a difference in th<-_. apparisal as to identi<•al t•quipment 1night well be explained on a difference
in condition. It 1nust be reme1nbered, however, that
:\lr. Parimore did not see the equipment at the time.
He h'~tifiPd, as did both ~Ir. Si1ns and l\Ir. Phillips, that
in valuing the equipn1ent some 21j2 years after the efft'rtiYe date of his valuation, he had to assume average
rondition for each piece of equipment. I low do you explain varying valuation on identical equipment ·when
you are assuming identical condition? The

onl~-

answer
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is that Exhibit A-4 was hurriedly and carelessly prepared in an effort to build up valuation and not to
arrive at accurate valuations.
The defendants submit, therefore, that the valuation
on the rolling stock as established by :Mr. Grant Sims
in the amount of $122,996.77 should be accepted by this
Court as being accurate rather than tlw $175,000.00
found by the trial Court.
2. SIMS REALTY, 1XC.

The plaintiffs in their Brief 1nake much of the
fact that the defendants did not call an independent
realtor for the purpose of appraising the four parcels
of real property which 1nake up the great bulk of the
assets of the Sims Realty Company. The defendants did
not call a realtor because of the feeling of counsel that
a fair valuation of these tracts of realty can be obtained
from Exhibit P-5, introduced by the plaintiff's witness
Cook.
We are not in agreen1ent with the conclusions advanced by Mr. Cook, but it appears that from an
examination of P-5 any person, whether realtor or not,
can obtain sufficient basic data on which to arrive at
a fair valuation of these properties. This data, when
properly analyzed, leads to the conclusion that the appraisal of 1\ir. Grant Silns, placing the value of this
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

61
pro{H'rty at IH'tW<'<'n $75,000.00 and $100,000.00, is very
nt>ar to accurate, and that the appraisal of the $152,100.00
n·tHlrtl•d h~· ~I r. Cook and Mr. Johns is patently exhoritant.

Exhibit P-5 lists the four tracts of real property as
Pan·<'b A, B, C and D. For purposes of discussion here,
Wl'

will list the1n similarly.

Pa reel A: ·This parcel is located on the north side
of -H h South Street, a little west of midway between Main
and \YP~t Temple Streets. It has a frontage of 66· feet
and an area of 10,890 square feet. On the property is
lorated a building which is without value. In fact, Cook
and .I ohns in their analysis reached the conclusion that
the presence of the building, rather than enhancing the
value of the land, actually detracts from it by $5,000.00.
In arriving at their valuation of $55,000.00, Cook and
.I ohns assmned a valuation of $5.50 per square foot
for a total of $59,896.00, less $5,000.00 for demolition
of the existing building. They ignored the matter of
frontal footage. However, the valuation they have placed
worked out to a figure of $833.00 per frontal foot.

The market cmnparison price which they have attached to their exhibit, however, shows that the highest
price paid for land in that vicinity ·was the Newhouse
Realty property, which sold in 1961 for $767 per frontal
foot and $-1.93 per square foot. This court, from its
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knowledge of the area in question, however, can take
notice that the Newhouse Realty property is of considerably more value on a frontal footage basis or on a
square footage basis than is the Sims property. To
begin with, the Sims property has a small frontage and
considerable depth, and has no access fron1 any direction except from 4th South Street. The Newhouse Realty
property on the other hand is bounded by city streets on
three sides and appears to be one of the 1nost desirable
pieces of property in this section of town. Averaging
the two comparable sale figures out to give effect both
to square footage and frontal footage, we arrive at a
valuation on the real property of $33,957, assuming it
was not encumbered by a worthless building. Deducting
Cook and John's estimate for demolition in the amount
of $5,000.00 we arrive at a valuation on this property
of $28,957. This seems consistent with the purchase price
paid by Sims Realty. ·This property ·was purchased in
19·38 for a total purchase price of $18,238.7 +. During the
ensuing 22 years, undoubtedly the real property increased considerably in value. At the same time, however, the building depreciated. The figure of $28,957
for Parcel A, therefore, appears to be well supported
by the basic data in Exhibit P-:J.

Parcel B: Parcel B is on the X orth side of 2nd South
street almost to 1st "\Vest street. It has a frontage of
50 feet and a depth of 120 feet, and contains 6,000 square
feet. Cook and .Johns arriye at a value of $24,000 for
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tlti:-; propPrty on t1H· basis of a valuation of $4.00 per
~~1nare foot. TlH·y ignore entirPI~· the frontal footage
npproaeh to ya]uation. They arrive at a value of the
improYt'lll<'nt~ on that land at a figure of $9,513.

Rt>f'PITing to their market c01nparison sheet, howt'YPI', the only c01nparable sale in recent years is that
ot' tlw trad of the Greek Orthodox Church, only a block
and a half mn1.y on a nn1eh more highly travelled street.
Tlw pri<·P paid for the Greek Orthodox Church property
wn~ *:m:2 pt>r frontal foot and $1.83 per square foot .
.Applying thP~<' yaluations to the Sims Realty property,
we would arrive at a value of $15,100 on a frontal footage
hn:-;i:-; and $10,980 on a squarP footage basis. Taking an
nvt•ragP of the~<' two to give effect to both, a valuation
of $1 :~.0:20 is arrived at for the real property. This land
wn~ pureha~t>d

in 1937 by Sims Realty C01npany for

$l,{i;lO. l\•rtainly it has not increased in value more than
~ tinw~

during the intervening yPars.

ln 1937 Sin1s RPalty Company paid $4,600 for the
huilding. \Yhile it has been n1odernized slightly since
that tinw, it has also been subject to nonnal depreciation.
There appears to be no 1nore reason for assigning to
tlw building today a greater value than it had when
pnrl'ha~Pcl.

Adding these figures together, it appears

from Exhibit P -5 that fair Yaluation of Parcel B would
be $17.ti:20.
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Parcel C: Parcel C is an unimproved tract of land
at 5th West and South ·Temple Streets, used by the
company for open storage of mobile equipment. The
company acquired this tract in six different parcels
between 1932 and 1956 at a total cost of $18,253.26. The
tract contains 153,164 square feet. Cook and Johns used
a valuation of 35¢ per square foot in arriving at a valuation of $5·3,600, to which they added $1,400 for fencing.
An examination of comparable sales in the vicinity,
however, indicates that a similar piece of property purchased by Hawa in December of 1961 ran only 27¢ per
foot. The Hawa property is located only a block from
the Sims Realty property. While it may be possible that
the property might bring more than 27¢ a foot if held
for a long period, in all probability on a reasonably
quick sale it would bring somewhat less, probably not
more than the 26¢ per square foot paid by the Overland
Moving Company for similar property on 4th \Vest and
South Ten1ple, less than a block fron1 the subject property. Applying a valuation of 26¢ per square foot to
the Sims Realty property, we arriYe at a valuation of
$39,822.64. This is more than twice what the company
paid for the property, smne of it purchased as recently
as four years before the valuation date. Adding to the
bare value of the property the value of fencing, it
appears that a fair valuation on Parcel {~ is $41,220.6-±.
Parcel D: Parcel D is a s1nall tract having a 66 foot
frontage and 165 foot depth, located at 130 South 5th
West. A small building used for storage is located on
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the propPrty. Cook and Johns valued the real estate
at $90.00 pPr frontal foot or 50¢ per square foot, which
yiPl<l~ a yaluation of $6,000. Their schedule of comparahiP ~alP~. howPv<'r, fails to bear this out. The nearest
<·omparahle ~ale to this property is shown as iten1 3
on th(:1ir ~[arkt't Comparison Chart, which is a tract of
land only one block from that which was purchased in

19(il hy Hawa. The price paid by Hawa was $45.00 a
frontal foot or 27¢ a square foot. Applying these valuations to thP ~ims HPalty property, we arrive at a valuation of $2,970 on a frontal basis and $2,940 on a square
rootagt> Jm~i~. This prO}H'l'ty was purchased by Sims
in 19-il for a total price of $3,825.61, which was divided
on the books a~ $485.85 for land and $3,339.76 for building~ . .\~suming thP buildings are still worth what they
Wt're originally, as appears logical, depreciation off~t'tting appreciation in value, a fair valuation on Tract
D i~ $6,309.
If

~alvagP

appear~

t•rtit·~

value is adopted by this Court, then it

that a fair valuation of the Sims Realty prop-

is $94,106, less a reasonable charge for selling

commissions in the a1nount of approximately $5,000, or
a net that should he charged to these defendants of
$S9,000. This figure is ·within the price range testified
tn by ~Ir. Grant Sin1s.

$105,000.00

i~

The trial Court's finding of

too high for the facts.
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3. NON-TANGIBLE ASSE·TS
In attempting to arrive at a valuation on a salvage
basis, the most difficult things to value, of course, are
the intangibles, including the franchises, permits and
good will. A general test adopted for valuation of intangibles belonging to a company is the earnings of
the company over and above a reasonable return on the
investment in tangible assets. For example, if the investment in tangible assets is $200,000 over and above
liabilities, and a reasonable return on the type of business, considering its hazards and uncertainties, is 8%,
the value of the intangibles would be determined by
capitalizing the average yearly earnings over and above
$16,000. On the other hand, if the con1pany is not earning a reasonable return on its tangible assets, its intangibles are worth nothing. It follov{s, therefore, as
testified to by Professor Stuart, that when a company
is worth n1ore for salvage of its tangibles than it is
as a going concern, its intangibles are without value.
Therefore, if the plaintiffs are going to 1naintain for a
valuation on the tangible assets over and above liabilities more than the $135,000 which Professor Stuart testified was the value of the cmnpany as a going concern,
then no value should be assigned to the intangibles,
and certainly no value can be assigned to that ethereal
thing called good will.
Operating rights are worth only what they will
earn. While there may he some 1narket for operating
rights by a cmnpetitor such as :JI r. Seifers, who wishes
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to gt·t rid of his cmnpetition, this does not appear to be
n \\"Pll Piwngh establi~lu·d or stable enough market upon
which to pn·di<'at<> any valuation. It is conceded by the
plaintiffs that "the valuation of the intangibles of Salt
1~nkt> Tr:.m~fpr Co., that is, the franchises, cerificates,
O[H'rating right~ and good will, is a difficult task," and
a.!.!;ain "it is unlikely, perhaps impossible, to find a situation whPn' operating rights are precisely the same from
t·ompany to company." This is certainly borne out by
tht> t t'st itnon~, of l\1r. Seifers. His basis for valuation
of operating rights is 1nade from a background of the
opPration of a highly successful company - a con1pany
which lta~ Pxtensive regular route interstate transcontitwntnl o1wrating rights which have yielded excellent operating ratios.* On the other hand, Salt Lake Transfer's
operating rights are, for the most part, in a field where
thP competition i~ heavy and where the return is relatiYt·l~· bad. On cro~s-Pxmnination, Mr. Seifers stated
that tlw operating ratio of Interstate l\fotor Lines, with
which he is comwcted, varied from 85 to 88. On the
ntht•r hand, the operating ratio of Salt Lake Transfer,
at>cording to the tPstimony of ~Ir. Gay, has not dropped
lwlow !l:l, and in 1960 was actually above 100. This court
ean takP judicial notice that the Public Service Conlmission of rtah has held that an operating ratio of frmn
!lO to D:2 is within a safe range. An operating ratio of
*Operating ratio is the test generally used by regulatory commissions
to determine the adequacy of the earnings of motor transport com~es. Simply stated, the operating ratio is the percentage relationship which operating expenses bear to operating revenues before the
application of any income tax.
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below 90 is that of an extraordinarily successful company, while a company operating at an operating ratio
of above 92 is in some danger, the danger increasing,
of course, the higher the operating ratio rises.
It is likewise apparent that the testimony of Mr.
Utzinger in this case cannot be given very great crPdence. Mr. Utzinger testified that his company was operating at a loss at the time he sold his operating rights
for substantial sums. Anyone hearing this might well
ask just why would anybody pay anything for operating
rights which were losing 1noney. Only one of two answers is available. Either the prospective purchasers
decided that Mr. Utzinger's operating loss resulted from
poor management and that his rights with proper management could yield a reasonable rate of return on the
amount paid, or there might be a case where there was
a purchaser who was already operating and who happened to need the particular rights which Jlr. rtzinger
offered for sale in order to supple1nent certain rights
which the purchaser already had. X o other explanations
are available. Is either of these bases sufficient, however, to establish a market value on other and different
rights 1 There is no factor in this case which would
indicate that the rights of Salt Lake Transfer Company
would yield a greater return under different manageInent. Furthermore, it appears that the rights which
Salt Lake Transfer has are rights which are subject to
a great deal of cmnpetition frmn like operating rights
held b~v competing companie~. It is highly speculative
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whether any competing cmnpany could be found which
would have operating rights which would need suppleuwnting hy the particular rights which Salt Lake Transfer might havP for sale.
rro attempt to place any substantial value on any
rights owned by Salt Lake Transfer would be speculatin• in the extreme. The fact that 1\Ir. Elmer Sims
tt-~ti t'iPd that he would not sell the operating rights for
$~SO,OOO, for to do so would put hirn out of a job and
rt•nder hb tangible assets valueless, has no effect here.
l~uitP ohYiou~l~·, tla•y would be very foolish to sell the
operating rights unless they were taken along with a
p~wkagP deal for the entire company, as to do so would
mPrt>ly h•nYP them with certain anitquated assets of
doubtful value on their hands and no way to use them.
Even the valuation of $50,000 put on the operating
right8 hy :\f r. Elnwr Sims and Mr. Grant Sims is obvion8ly no more than an educated guess, but represents
l'Prtainly the 1naxirnum that this court should accept
if it proceeds with valuation on a salvage basis. The
nnly l'08t basis of tlwse operating rights is the sum of
$3,000 paid to Hadley ·Transfer for the general con1modity authority purchased by S. L. Transfer. The
trial l'ourt's valuation at $150,000.00 appears to he a
l'l)lll}H'OllliSL' figure.

D. raluat ions by Cornpa raule Sales and Tax Appraisals
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There are two "purchase and sale" agreements of
interest in the combined Salt Lake Transfer-Sims Realty
operation which should be taken into consideration by
hte court in fixing a valuation:
1. The John Sims Transaction :

The most recent of these was the settlement of an
interest identical to that held by these plaintiffs by Mr.
John Sims to his brother, George A. Si1ns, in 1959. Indeed this appears to be the most persuasiYe evidence
in the entire case as to the amount which should be paid
to the plaintiffs. It should be borne in mind that GeorgP
A. Sims acquired from John Sims not just John Sims'
claim on the business, but also his porportionate share
of the accumulated and undistributed earnings. This
was an arms-length transaction arrived at by a knowledgable and discriminating seller with a knowledgable
and discri1ninating buyer, where neither was under any
compulsion to complete the transaction. John Sims was
no neophyte in the business world. The evidence is that
he was a successful automobile dealer in San Bernardino,
Calif. (R. 760), and therefore had knowledge not only
of business, but to some extent of automotive values.
lie voluntarily transferred his interest, identical with
these six plaintiffs, within one year of the time used
as the valuation date in this case, for the sum of $10,000.
\ Ve should also be mindful that George A. Si1ns is one
of the two designated by the father in 19:i2 to make
a valuation of the assetf'.
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., ThP Elmer Sims PurchasP:

In .Jan nary of 1953, Ebner Sims purchased from his
fntlwr. ~I ilton l{. Sim~. a 1j20th interest in the partner~hip for thP smn of $14,000, which would indicate a value
on the whole of $280,000. (R. 691) Two factors must be
tnkPn into considPration, howevPr, in evaluating this sale.
ThP fir~t b that it was made right near the conclusion
of the KorPan "Tar, when Salt Lake Transfer Company,
nlong with nParly every common carrier in the country,
h:Hl PXpPriPnced a period of unparalleled prosperity. The
('ompany'~ nPt Parnings for several years had equalled
or PXCPPded $50,000. On the other hand, we are attempting to value this property as of 1960, at which time the
<·ompany during the four preceding years had averaged
h·~~ than $20,000 per year net profit, and at which time
the eompany during the year 1960 was actually in a net
I«)~~ situation.
ThP second factor which must be subject to adjustnwnt if the Elmer Silns purchase is to be used as a basis
for valuation, is the fact that Elmer was purchasing not
only a portion of his father's interest in the partnership
a~~ .. t~. but also a portion of his father's interest in the
:weumulated but undistributed earnings w·hich everyone
agTPP~. in reaching a valuation in this case, we must treat
~t'paratPly as a liability of the company before reaching
n 1wt valuation.
:~.

The Inheritance Tax Appraisal:
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The plaintiffs placed in evidence during the trial of
the case the inheritance tax appraisal on the estate of
Milton K. Sims, which included a 30o/a interest in both
Salt Lake Transfer and Sims Realty. Expanding this
30% interest as set forth in the inheritance tax appraisal
to 100%, we would arrive at a total valuation on the
two companies of $365,000. Two matters must be taken
into consideration, however, in using this figure as a
valuation factor. The first of these is that appraisal
was not made by Mr. Sims at all, but was made by inheritance tax appraisers of the State of Utah, who were not
present in this case for cross-examination. As such, it
is highly improbable that this was competent evidence
at all, and if it was held to be cmnpetent in view of the
absence of opportunity for cross-examination, it should
be given very little weight.
The second factor which must be taken into consideration in regard to these fiigures is that they valued
not only Milton K. Sims 30% interest in the company
assets as a going concern, but also his 30% interest in
the accumulated but undrawn earnings of the Salt Lake
Transfer Cmnpany, which everyone in this case agrees
must be eliminated from consideration, or, in other words,
treated as a liability in arriving at a valuation for purposes of this ease.
CONCLUSION
,The 1932 Agree1nent of the plaintiffs n1ade a sale
then and there to the new Salt Lake Transfer Company.
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llt·ferment of paynwnt of the purchase price and interest
thereon waH an n<·<·<·ph·d incident of a Depression sale.
'rhPir heloved hrother, George acted in good faith and
mu~t not IJP penalized now because he let the plaintiffs
J'4'('t>iVP their favorable interest payments for a long time
and did not elmw the1n out the first opportunity when
monPy waH nYailablP.
\YP urge the Court to reverse the findings and judgnwnt of the trial Court that these interests, sold and
hong-ht in 1932, are to be valued as of 1960. Should the
( •ourt disagree with that position, we urge that the valuation finally fixed be reduced to conform with the conh•mporaneous values set by plaintiffs or at least upon a
~nlvag-P hasis and that it be returned to the Court to take
(ividenee as to the necessary costs and expenses of such
liquidation and salvage.

Xo hardship will result to plaintiffs by providing
them with payment for the value of their interests as
of tht:> date of their sale in 1932. Their 28 years of
nequiescence in the debtor-creditor relationship should
foreclose this belated effort to have the court made a new
and different contract from that expressed by their 1932
.\greement.
Respectfully submitted:

PrGSLEY HAYES, RAniPTON &
'VATKISS

HARRY D. PUGSLEY
CAL YI~ L. RAl\IPTON
AttnrnP,lJS

for defPndrmts.
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APPEXDIX ON YALrATIONS
The result of the various bases of valuation contPnd.-d for hy the parties in this case may be summarized
ns follows:

A.

\'aluation as of April 6, 1932:
.Appraised valuation of assets by
~Irs. Bullough and Mrs. Sims as of
April 6, 1932 ------------------------------------------$ 21,686.46
Aecumulated but undrawn earnings____ 30.581.79
rrotal --------------------------------------------------------

52,268.25

B. Valuation as a going concern as of
June 30, 1960 :
Testimony of Professor Stuart as
to valuation as a going concern
$135,000 X 6o/a% X 6 ----------------------------$ 54,000.00
Aecun1ulated but undrawn earnings____ 30,581.79
Total -------------------------------------------------------C.

84,581.79

Salvage Yalue:
1. lT nder valuations contended for
by plaintiffs :
Rolling stock ------------------------------------$254,450.00
Franchises ---------------------------------------- 365,000.00
~ims Realty Co. real property ______ 152,100.00
Other assets of Sims Realty Co.____ 11,088.44

782,638.44
Less agreed excess of liabilities
over other assets ----------------------------

34,017.09
748,621.35
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6o/3 % X 6 ........................................ 299,448.54
Plus accumulated and undrawn
earnings ··············----·····-············--·-··-· 30,581.79

X

Total ···-······-···--·····-------------------·-······-- 330,030.33
Less a reasonable cost of salvage
~
·Total -----------------------·-----------------------2. Under valuations contended for
by defendants :
Rolling stock -----------------------------------Franchises ---------------------------------------Sims Realty Co. real property______
Other assets of Sims Realty Co.____

~

122,996.77
50,000.00
89,000.00
11.088.44
273,085.21

Less agreed excess of liabilities
over other assets ----------------------------

34,017.09

Total -------------------------------------------------- 239,068.12
X 6% o/o X 6 ---------------------------------------95,627.~.!
Plus accumulated and undrawn
earnings -------------------------------------------- 30,581.79

Total -------------------------------------------------- 126,209.03
Less a reasonable cost of salvage
~
T·otal -----------------------------------------------3. Salvage Values set by the trial
Court:
Sims Realty, Inc.- realty ............ $105,000.00
Rolling stock ------------------------------------ 175,000.00
Investments -------------------------------------- 3,312.00
Intangibles ---------------------------------------- 150,000.00
$328,312.00
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D.

< Hlu•r bases of valuation:
1. Snm paid to .T ohn Si1ns:
$10,000 X 6--------------·-·····-············--------$ 60,000.00
., Value agreed upon by plaintiffs
in 1959 after death of l\I. K. Sims :
$18,000.00 X 6 ----------··-···----------------···· 108,000.00
3. \' alue based upon Elmer Si1ns
purchase $280,000 minus accrued
hut undrawn earnings of defendants, $84,252.37 ········--------················ 195,747.63
X 6% )'c X 6 ----------······-········--·-----------·
78,298.80
Plus accrued but undrawn
earnings of plaintiffs -------------------- 30,581.79

Total ···-················----------···············----- 108,880.59
-!. Based upon inheritance tax
appraisal:
$370,850 minus accumulative earnings of defendants x 6o/3 o/o x 6______ 118,639.20
Accumulated earnings of
plaintiffs --------------····-····--------------------· ·30,581.79

Total ·············----------------------------------··· 149,220.99
In each instance the amount shown would be less
the $48,000.00 already paid to the plaintiffs by Salt Lake
Transfer Company.
The defendants urge that the court reverse the lower
Court's holding and declare the defendants entitled to
recover judgment based upon the 1932 valuation plus
cumulative earnings, or a total of $52,268.25, minus
$48,000 already paid, or a balance of $4,268.25.
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If the court orders a valuation as of June 3, 1960,
the most persuasive evidence as to valuation of that date
is the price paid to John Sims for his entire interest,
including his interest in the accumulated and undrawn
earnings, or a total of $60,000, minus $48,000, or a balance
of $12,000.
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